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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
SECURITY DEVICES
Gerald Le Van*
COLLATERAL MORTGAGES
After more than a century of considerable confusion about
mortgages to secure future advances and collateral mortgages,
much of the mist has been cleared away this year by two deci-
sions, Thrift Funds Canal, Inc. v. Foy1 and New Orleans Silver-
smiths, Inc. v. Toups.2
The decision of the court of appeal in Foy was discussed at
length in this Symposium last year in connection with a brief
review of mortgages to secure future advances and collateral
mortgages.8 In 1963, Foy executed a note in the amount of
$10,000 secured by a first mortgage on an unimproved lot in
Jefferson Parish. Three years later, he executed a note to the
same creditor in the amount of $3,000, the second note reciting
that it was also secured by the 1963 mortgage. In 1968, Foy
executed a third note, this time in favor of Thrift Funds Canal,
Inc., secured by a second mortgage on the same lot. The original
mortgage had not been extinguished by payment of the $10,000
note at the time the $3,000 note was executed. Upon foreclosure
of the second mortgage by Thrift Funds, the Fourth Circuit 4 held
that since the original act of mortgage did not recite that it was
given to secure future advances, the second note (for $3,000) was
not secured thereby; or, in other words, a mortgage granted to
secure future advances must so state.
In the course of affirming the Fourth Circuit (for different
reasons), the opinion of the supreme court written by Justice
Sanders treats a number of issues which could have been omitted
in resolving Foy on its rather peculiar facts. However, it appears
that four members of the court selected Foy as a vehicle for
resolving, at least in dictum, a number of issues involving future
advances-collateral mortgages about which lawyers have debated
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 261 La. 573, 260 So.2d 628 (1972).
2. 261 So.2d 252 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972), vr4ts deMed, 262 La. 309, 263
So.2d 47 (1972).
3. 32 LA. L. Psv. 233 (1972).
4. 242 So.2d 253 (La. App. 4th ir. 1970).
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for years. For this reason, Foy is probably one of the most impor-
tant Louisiana decisions in the area of secured transactions.
The opinion begins by classifying all conventional mortgages
into three categories: (1) mortgages to secure specific debts,
(2) mortgages to secure future advances, and (3) collateral mort-
gages. The latter is defined as follows:
"A collateral mortgage is a mortgage designed, not to
directly secure an existing, debt, but to secure a mortgage
note pledged as collateral security for a debt or a succession
of debts. The mortgage is usually drawn in favor of future
holders, represented by a nominal mortgagee. For conve-
nience in pledging, the companion promissory note is usually
payable to bearer on demand. The maker may reissue the
note from time to time."5 (Citations omitted.)
The court refused to classify the Foy first mortgage as a collat-
eral mortgage since it secured a specific debt and possessed "none
of the formal characteristics of a collateral mortgage." It rejected
the argument that reference in the printed act of mortgage to
multiple notes contemplated anything other than the possibility
that the specific debt might be represented by multiple notes or
that the printed reference to "any future holder" of such notes
contemplated anyone other than the transferee by negotiation of
the specific note described in the mortgage. Nor was the court
impressed that the mortgage form referred to "other indebted-
ness secured hereby," which referred to nothing more than
advances for taxes, insurance premiums, and attorney fees which
are customarily secured by the act of mortgage.
The supreme court rejected the Fourth Circuit's position that
in order to secure a future advance, the act of mortgage must
so recite. According to the opinion:
"It may be phrased as security for an existing debt, when no
debt in fact exists, and yet secure a later debt in accordance
with the intention of the parties.... We find nothing in the
present record, however, to show that, when the first mort-
gage was executed, the parties intended that it secure future
advances. Quite to the contrary, the record reflects that it
was designed only to secure an existing debt, a loan made
5. 261 La. 573, 579, 260 So.2d 628, 630 (1972). (Emphasis added.)
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contemporaneously with the execution of the mortgage....
We conclude that the present mortgage is one for a specific
debt." (Emphasis added.)
Justices Hamlin, Dixon, and Summers dissented. Justice
Hamlin found evidence in the record satisfactory to him that
Foy and his original mortgagee had agreed that the first mort-
gage would secure future advances and that the agreement was
broad enough to cover the note in question. He seemed to place
great reliance in the mortgage form provisions referred to above.
Justice Dixon felt that Walmsley v. Resweber7 should control
and that the intent for the mortgage to secure future advances
should be reflected in its face. He stated: "Our holding implies
that these loans are unsecured in absence of parol evidence to
establish the intent of the parties at the time the mortgage was
executed."8 (Emphasis added.)
The majority opinion makes clear that whether or not a
mortgage may secure money yet to be lent need not be disclosed
by the public records. To the title examiner, this means that
every mortgage must be assumed to secure the maximum amount
stated therein. To the lender who utilizes a mortgage which
does not recite the parties' contemporaneous intention to secure
future loans, it means that he must preserve or obtain evidence
of that intention. To the cautious practitioner, the Foy decision
means, as always, that the better part of wisdom is to recite the
intention to secure future advances in the act of mortgage. The
decision is a welcome relief to those practitioners who have
omitted such recitals in existing mortgages as well as a warning
that they had best change their ways or be prepared to bear a
rather heavy burden of proof. I must join Justice Dixon in ques-
tioning the desirability of permitting parol evidence to vary a
mortgage which, on its face, may look like it secures only a sin-
gle specific indebtedness. The temptation to confect such evi-
dence in retrospect should be discouraged.
6. Id. at 582-83, 260 So.2d at 631. The court specifically rejected as
dictum a statement to the contrary in WalmsleJ v. Resweber, 105 La. 522, 30
So. 5 (1901); "In Walmsley, the basic question was one of priority as be-
tween a 'collateral' mortgage and a third person's mortgage that attached
while the collateral mortgage notes were in the hands of the maker." Id
at 583-84 n.3, 260 So.2d at 632 n.3.
7. 105 La. 522, 30 So. 5 (1901).
8. 261 La. 573, 604, 260 So.2d 631, 639 (1972).
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New Orleans Silversmiths, Inc. v. Toups dealt with compet-
ing collateral mortgages, each of which fit the definition of "col-
lateral mortgage" set forth in Foy. Toups borrowed $75,000 from
the Hibernia National Bank secured by the pledge of a collateral
mortgage note in the amount of $150,000. The collateral mort-
gage affected lots in the City of New Orleans. The pledged note
secured the initial loans and any other indebtedness due the bank
up to $150,000. Later in the year, he executed a second collateral
mortgage affecting the same property securing a collateral mort-
gage note for $50,000, which note he pledged to Silversmiths as
security for a $35,000 loan. Thereafter, a corporation in which
Toups was interested borrowed $95,000 from the Hibernia Bank.
Toups personally guaranteed the corporate loan, and the original
collateral mortgage note, which had remained in the bank's pos-
session, likewise secured its repayment. Toups defaulted on his
loan from Silversmiths and the latter foreclosed. The bank inter-
vened, claiming the first $150,000 of proceeds of foreclosure as
pledgee of the collateral mortgage note both to secure Toups'
personal debt of $75,000 and to secure $75,000 of the $95,000 cor-
porate debt. Silversmiths admitted that the bank primed as to
the original loan to Toups but claimed that its second mortgage
primed the Hibernia as to the corporate loan. In essence, counsel
for Silversmiths argued:
(1) that a collateral mortgage becomes effective as to third
persons only from the time it is recorded or from the
time the collateral mortgage note is pledged, whichever
is later;
(2) that the collateral mortgage note given the bank could
not have been pledged to secure the loan to the corpora-
tion until the corporate loan was made;
(3) that the corporate loan was made subsequent to the
recordation of the collateral mortgage note which Silver-
smiths held; and thus
(4) that the Silversmiths mortgage must necessarily prime
the bank mortgage insofar as the latter secured the cor-
porate loan.
On the other hand, counsel for the bank argued that its collateral
mortgage note had been pledged once and for all on the date of
original delivery to the bank (the mortgage having been previ-
ously recorded) and that the date of original delivery fixed the
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
rank of its mortgage regardless of the date of any actual loans
which it might secure.
In the case of the classical mortgage to secure future
advances, article 3293 of the Civil Code9 gives the mortgage "a
retrospective effect to the time of the contract." Apparently, the
"contract" referred to is the act of mortgage itself which, of
course, is not effective as against third persons until properly
recorded. However, it is doubtful that this article was drafted
in contemplation of the collateral mortgage device as we know
it. In 1952, article 3158 of the Civil Code, dealing with the for-
malities of pledge, was amended to give retroactive effect to a
pledge to secure future advances so long as the thing pledged
remained in the hands of the pledgee to secure
''a particular loan ... or to secure advances to be made up
to a certain amount, and if so desired to secure any other
obligations or liabilities of the pledgor to the pledgee then
existing or thereafter arising ... and such renewals, addi-
tional loans and advances or other obligations or liabilities
shall be secured by the collateral to the same extent as if
they came into existence when the instrument or item was
originally pledged ... ." (Emphasis added.)
By design or accident, the term "shall be secured by the
same collateral" could refer not only to a pledged note, but also
to whatever "collateral" secures the payment of that note. From
this premise, one can plausibly reason that if the collateral mort-
gage note is to be given retroactive effect, like effect is to be
given to the rank of the collateral mortgage itself. This is the
way the Fourth Circuit resolved the ranking problem.
Judge Lemmon dissented, principally on the ground that
article 3158 could not affect the rank of the collateral mortgage
but only the rank of the pledged note. Writs were refused by the
supreme court on the basis that the result was correct. Justice
Tate concurred in the refusal, acknowledging that although
article 3158 did not
"regulate the extent of the mortgage and the necessity for a
9. "But the right of mortgage, in this case, shall only be realized in so
far as the promise shall be carried into effect by the person making it. The
fulfillment of the promise, however, shall impart to the mortgage a retro-
spective effect to the time of the contract."
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principal debt secured thereby.... Taking into considera-
tion the jurisprudential development of the 'collateral mort-
gage' security device, based upon the pledge of the collateral
mortgage note, I think the court of appeal majority ascribed
an appropriate legislative intent to the 1962 amendment of
Article 3158."10
Perhaps we should ask what would have happened had
Toups repaid his personal loan in full prior to the recording of
the Silversmiths mortgage and the bank retained the collateral
mortgage note until the corporate loan. The Fourth Circuit
answered this question in dictum:
"The retroactive effect created by this statute [article 3158]
may, by mutual consent, be made applicable not only to
renewal of the primary loan but to new or additional loans,
even though the original obligation has been fully paid.""1
(Emphasis added.)
Considering the origin and widespread usage of the collateral
mortgage device, the result in Silversmiths is not surprising.
Prior cases established that the collateral mortgage would rank
as of the time the collateral mortgage note was pledged. So long
as the collateral mortgage note remains in the pledgee's posses-
sion, article 3158 deems each new loan secured by the pledged
note as though such loan had been made simultaneously with its
initial delivery in pledge. Thus, if the collateral mortgage ranks
effective with the delivery of the collateral mortgage note, and if
subsequent advances are deemed secured by the collateral mort-
gage note as of its original delivery, then, in effect, each subse-
quent advance is also secured by the collateral mortgage, which
likewise ranks from the time of delivery of the collateral mort-
gage note. To those not familiar with this practice, the collat-
eral mortgage device may sound strange and circuitous. To those
of us who are accustomed to using it, the Foy and Silversmiths
decisions bring a new measure of comfort.
JUDICIAL MORTGAGES
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Ballard12 involved
10. 262 La. 809, 263 So.2d 47 (1972).
11. 261 So.2d 252, 255 (1972).
12. 250 So.2d 217 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
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a judicial mortgage affecting property subject to the Louisiana
homestead exemption. The judgment debtor was adjudicated
bankrupt following the recordation of the judgment. The trustee
in bankruptcy, recognizing the homestead exemption, disclaimed
the property in favor of the bankrupt, whereupon the bankrupt
sued for the erasure of the judicial mortgage, claiming that the
trustee's disclaimer was binding on all other creditors including
the plaintiff. The First Circuit refused to order cancellation of
the inscription. In its view, the actions of the bankruptcy
trustee bound neither the plaintiff nor the court. Citing its earlier
decision in Jaubert Bros., Inc. v. Landry,1 the court observed
that, had the bankrupt proved that the homestead was worth no
more than the balance due on the purchase price, he would have
been entitled to a judgment declaring the homestead free of the
judicial mortgage.
PRIVATE Womums ACT
As usual, the Private Works Act (R.S. 9:4801-42) has
prompted considerable litigation. However, space limitations
allow mention of only a few cases.14 In Long Leaf Lumber, Inc.
v. Svolos,15 a material supplier filed a lien but could prove only
13. 15 So.2d 158 (La. App. 1st Or. 1943).
14. See, especially: D'Aubln v. Mauroner-Craddock, Inc., 262 La. 350, 263
So.2d 317 (1972) (construction lender with knowledge of contractor's diversion
of construction loan proceeds to repay loan by law firm of which lender's
chairman of the board was a partner-to be noted In subsequent issue of this
Review); McNeely v. Barron Constr. Co., 261 So.2d 333 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972)
(no failure of consideration for performance bond Issued for 19 of the con-
tract price but surety agreed to pay 15% attorney fees In the event of de-
fault); State Lumber & Supply Co. v. Gill, 259 So.2d 639 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1972) (personal action by material furnisher against owner survives peremp-
tion of lien where supplier in privity with owner's representative); Magnon
Elec., Inc., v. J. P. Van Way Eng'r Contr., Inc., 256 So.2d 851 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1972) (lien claimant's failure to object to solvency of surety within 10 days
after concursus proceeding filed under R.S. 9:4804 absolves owner from
liability-liens properly cancelled; surety became insolvent subsequent
to contestability period); Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Milstid, 253
So.2d 571 (La. App. 1st CIr. 1971) (owner's statutory obligation to furnish
performance and lien bond does not create any obligation to lien claimants
where bond by its terms secures performance only-suretyship strictly con-
strued); Jeffers' Trust v. Justice, 253 So.2d 234 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971)
(work "completed" under unrecorded contract notwithstanding lack of
required approval of work by municipal and parochial inspectors); Walters
Air Cond. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 252 So.2d 919 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1971) (payment of subcontractor impairing surety's right of subrogation);
Calandro Dev., Inc. v. R. M. Butler Contr., Inc., 249 So.2d 254 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1971) (surety on performance bond subrogated to contractor's tort
action against negligent design engineer).
15. 258 So.2d 121 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1972).
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a part of his alleged deliveries to the job site by signed receipts.
To establish the balance, he called a reconstruction expert to
testify as to the amount of like materials actually used in con-
struction. The court found such testimony "helpful" but insuf-
ficient to establish that the lien claimant had supplied materials
in excess of that reflected by signed invoices.
The supplier further claimed interest at the rate of eight
per cent from date of delivery as stipulated in his agreement
with the contractor. The court refused, pointing out that the
owner was not a party to that contract, and limited the claim for
interest to the legal rate from the date the lien was perfected by
filing.'6
In 1-10, Inc. v. Justice,17 a motel construction job was shut
down and a notice of default recorded by the owner. The general
contractor filed a lien affidavit in the amount of the entire con-
tract price less payment received to date, his claim covering not
only the balance due him but also for "potential or contingent
liability to subcontractors." The Fourth Circuit rejected his
claim that the lien secured contingent claims and ordered a par-
tial erasure to that extent. His notice of suit also claimed that
the "potential or contingent liability to subcontractors" was due
in quantum meruit. This was viewed as a non-contractual claim,
which was not secured by liens created by the PWA.
PRESCRIPTION
Joseph Dainow*
Due to restricted budgets and corresponding reduction in
pages for printing the LAw REVIEW, these comments are neces-
sarily limited to those which are important and necessary. Under
the circumstances, the more important comments are the critical
ones; this should not be misunderstood as a generalization be-
cause, on the contrary, I find there has been a marked improve-
ment in the way in which civil law problems are being handled
and in the way that opinions are being written. With this ob-
servation, it is hoped that the comments which follow will be
considered seriously and will serve a constructive purpose.
16. See Pringle-Associated Mtg. Corp. v. Eanes, 254 La. 705, 226 So.2d
502 (1969), for the proposition that the lien claimant's personal right against
the owner does not arise unless and until the lien Is filed.
17. 260 So.2d 89 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
